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OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

JAN 19 2012

FILED

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BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Respondent Thomas has been a licensed member of the Arizona Bar since 1991. Tr. 10/26/11, p. 5.
- 2. Respondent Thomas was elected Maricopa County Attorney in the fall of 2004. He served as MCAO from January 1, 2005, until his resignation on April 5, 2010. Id.

2006 opinion letters (count 1)

LAW OFFICES

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Attorneys for Respondent Andrew Thomas

3. Prior to the 2004 general election, Respondent Thomas met with Supervisor Stapley. During their meeting, Supervisor Stapley asked Respondent Thomas if he would support letting the BOS have its own attorneys, rather than a lawyer from the MCAO. Respondent Thomas was non-committal. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 12.

4. After Respondent Thomas was elected, but before he took office, he had a conversation with the outgoing MCA, Richard Romley, who warned Respondent to watch out for Supervisor Stapley. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 30-31.

- 5. Arizona statutes establish the County Attorney's role. Part of the County Attorney's role is to serve as the public prosecutor of the County. The County Attorney also acts as the legal advisor to the Board of Supervisors ("BOS" or "the Board"), attends its meetings and opposes claims against the County that he deems unjust or illegal. A.R.S. §11-532.
- 6. From time-to-time the County Attorney appoints outside counsel to represent or advise the Board, the County or County officials. During Respondent Thomas's tenure, the MCAO appointed outside counsel if it concluded there was a need for particularized expertise that was not in the MCAO itself, there was a dispute between two County offices, or the Board and another County official, or the County Attorney declared a conflict. Tr. 9/15/11, pp. 84-86.
- 7. Sometime prior to February 13, 2006, Paul Golab, the deputy MCA who had acted as advisor to the BOS, announced his retirement. Respondent Thomas sent a letter dated February 13, 2006, notifying then-Chairman Stapley of Golab's retirement, and assuring Stapley that the Board's input into the selection process will be "sought and encouraged." Exhibit 250.
- 8. Approximately a week later, Mr. Stapley had a letter dated February 21, 2006, hand-delivered to Respondent Thomas.

Exhibit 251. In that letter, Mr. Stapley thanked Respondent Thomas for "the mutual decision" regarding the Board's representation. The letter went on to confirm a purported agreement by which the new lawyer would be "selected and appointed by" the BOS and be part of the BOS's budget.

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- 9. The Stapley letter was delivered to Phil MacDonnell, the number two person in the MCAO, and one of Mr. Thomas's advisors, by Chairman Stapley and County Manager David Smith personally. Tr. 9/15/11, pp. 77-78.
- 10. During the unannounced meeting, Chairman Stapley pressed Mr. MacDonnell to sign the letter. Mr. MacDonnell questioned whether Mr. Thomas had made such an agreement, and declined to sign the letter. Id.
- 11. Respondent Thomas denies that such an agreement ever existed. Tr. 10/26/11, p. 205. Respondent Thomas testified that the putative agreement would be contrary to the provisions of A.R.S. §11-532 and the Supreme Court decision in <u>Bd. of Supervisors of Maricopa County v. Woodall</u>, 120 Ariz. 379, 381-82, 586 P.2d 628, 630-31 (1978). Id., pp. 207-208.
- 12. Respondent Thomas thereafter wrote a series of letters to Mr. Stapley about the issues of counsel for the Board and the appointment of outside counsel. Exhibits 6 through 10.
- 13. Mr. MacDonnell participated in the drafting of exhibits 6 through 10. Tr. 9/15/11, pp. 81-84, 86.
- 14. Respondent Thomas did not, in fact, have a personal interest that created a substantial risk that his representation of

the Board would be materially limited when he expressed the opinions in exhibits 6 through 10.

- 15. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas did not in fact have a personal interest that created a substantial risk that his representation of the Board would be materially limited when he expressed the opinions in exhibits 6 through 10.
- 16. Respondent Thomas's belief that it was appropriate to express to the BOS the opinions stated in exhibits 6 through 10 was reasonable.
- 17. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards for Imposing Discipline ("ABA Standards") when he sent exhibits 6 through 10 to the MCBOS.
- 18. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards for Imposing Discipline ("ABA Standards") when he sent exhibits 6 through 10 to the MCBOS.
- 19. Respondent Thomas filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against the Board in June 2006. Exhibit 11.
- 20. Before filing suit, Respondent Thomas appointed outside counsel to represent the Board. Exhibit 9.
- 21. The dispute between Mr. Thomas and the Board was settled, even before the Board answered the lawsuit. The settlement was memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding; Exhibit 15.

Mr. Thomas's 2006 news release (counts 2 and 3)

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- 22. On the same day Respondent Thomas filed the suit against the MCBOS, he issued a statement announcing the suit's filing. Exhibit 13.
- 23. In that statement, Respondent Thomas declared that he "t[ook] this step only after holding numerous meetings and discussions with all five supervisors, meeting with the board collectively, sending the chairman of the board no fewer than five letters making plain the illegality of his proposed actions, and seeking to resolve these matters in various other ways." Id.
- 24. At the time he issued the June 14, 2006, statement, Respondent Thomas reasonably believed that the BOS, the highest authority that can act on behalf of Maricopa County, insisted upon an action that was clearly a violation of law, and that the violation was reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to Maricopa County and/or its taxpayers. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 214-215.
- 25. Respondent Thomas's belief that this disclosure of client confidences was necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization was reasonable.
- 26. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas's belief that this disclosure of client confidences was necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization was unreasonable.
- 27. The statement also referenced lawsuits brought by County officials Sandra Dowling and Philip Keen. Respondent Thomas stated that he could not "in good conscience defend the Board of

- 28. At the time he issued this news release, Respondent Thomas was unaware that civil deputies in the MCAO had been involved on the Board's behalf in the Keen and Dowling disputes. Tr. 10/26/11, p. 21.
- 29. Respondent's failure to be aware of the MCAO's prior representation of the BOS was not unreasonable. Ordinarily, the MCAO assigned outside counsel to each department or the BOS in intra-county disputes. Tr. 9/15/11, pp. 84-85.
- 30. Respondent Thomas did not know nor reasonably should have known that the statements contained in the 2006 news release would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the Dowling or Keen matters.
- 31. IBC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas knew or reasonably should have known that the statements contained in the 2006 news release would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the Dowling or Keen matters.
- 32. Respondent Thomas did not possess any culpable mental state under the ABA Standards when he issued the 2006 news release.
- 33. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any culpable mental state under the ABA Standards when he issued the 2006 news release.

Stapley I (counts 4, 5 and 9)

34. In January 2007, the MCAO and the MCSO formed a joint task force called MACE, which stands for Maricopa Anti-corruption

Effort. Tr. 10/26/11, p. 40.

- 35. Initially, Anthony Novitsky and Vicki Kratovil, the head of the Special Crimes Bureau of the MCAO, were tasked with the responsibility of heading up the MCAO's involvement in the task force. Id., p. 227
- 36. Early on in MACE's life, Respondent Thomas received an opinion from private attorney William French, a former Presiding Criminal Judge of Maricopa County. Id., p. 36.
- 37. Judge French's memo opined that the MCAO did not have a conflict prosecuting county officials. Exhibit 19, pp. 497-506.
- 38. The question whether there was an improper relationship between Supervisor Stapley and Phoenix attorney Tom Irvine has its genesis in a conversation during which then-Presiding Judge Mundell told former MCSO Chief Deputy Hendershott that she had been pressured to hire Irvine in connection with the Court Tower Project. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 119-120.
- 39. During a conversation that occurred sometime in 2007, Respondent Thomas told Mark Goldman, then a special assistant deputy in the MCAO, about the perceived Stapley-Irvine relationship. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 119-120.
- 40. Although the two disagree whether Respondent Thomas asked Mr. Goldman to do research, or whether Mr. Goldman volunteered to do it, Mr. Goldman began research to look into the ties between Supervisor Stapley and attorney Irvine. Id.; Tr. 10/12/11, pp. 138, 167.
 - 41. Mr. Goldman obtained information off the internet. Tr.

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- 42. Mr. Goldman obtained whatever information he gathered for the purpose of trying to see what properties Mr. Stapley owned to see if there was any connection to Mr. Irvine. Tr. 10/12/11, pp. 135-137.
- 43. Mr. Goldman completed his investigation into Mr. Stapley before Mr. Goldman went to Mexico in May of 2007. Id., pp. 140-141.
- 44. Mr. Goldman went to a MACE unit meeting to present the information he had gathered. Id., p. 146.
- 45. At the time, neither Mr. Goldman nor anyone else in the MACE unit appreciated that the disclosure form might document a criminal failure to disclose.
- 46. Contemporaneous records kept by MACE head Vicki Kratovil document that the MACE unit did not review the disclosure for purposes of deciding whether a disclosure violation had occurred, but rather as a document generated as part of MACE's Stapley-Irvine investigation. Exhibit 19.
- 47. Meanwhile, Respondent Thomas forgot about the matter. Respondent Thomas testified that Mr. Goldman reminded Respondent Thomas in early 2008 about his (Goldman's) efforts in 2007. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 128-129.
- 48. Respondent Thomas asked Respondent Aubuchon to look into Donald Stapley's financial disclosures in March 2008. Tr.

10/26/11, p. 129.

- 49. Respondent Thomas asked that the investigation be completed within a month. The instruction had nothing to do with the statute of limitations. This instruction was given instead because Respondent Thomas had concluded that matters languished unless he set deadlines. Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 65-66; Tr. 10/26/11, p. 238.
- 50. When Respondent Aubuchon began her investigation, she learned that Mark Goldman had previously obtained information about Supervisor Stapley, including the financial disclosure form. Nevertheless, it was Respondent Aubuchon's understanding the financial disclosure form concerned a different investigation, not pertaining to the sufficiency of Supervisor Stapley's financial disclosure forms. Id, pp. 41-42, 45-46.
- 51. In May 2008, Respondent Aubuchon had a meeting with law enforcement personnel. She had at the meeting a document that the various police officers have styled a "draft indictment." The so-called draft indictment was actually a template Respondent Aubuchon created for law enforcement to use during the investigation. It was drafted from another criminal non-disclosure case (Petersen). Tr. 10/25/11, p. 65; Exhibit 186.
- 52. Other Stapley disclosure forms were secured by MCSO investigators from Fran McCarroll, the Clerk of the BOS, in May 2008. Tr. 10/14/11, pp. 146-147.
- 53. Respondent Aubuchon completed her review in late May 2008. She presented her conclusions to Respondent Thomas.

Respondent Thomas directed Respondent Aubuchon not to go forward with an indictment until after the November 2008 election so as not to prejudice Supervisor Stapley's chances of re-election. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 238-239.

- 54. Respondent Aubuchon presented the Stapley case to a grand jury, which returned an indictment against Supervisor Stapley on November 20, 2008. Exhibit 38.
- 55. Respondent Thomas left the charging decisions to Respondent Aubuchon. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 136-137, 138-139; tr. 10/25/11, p. 69.
- 56. Exhibits 35, 246, 304, 509 and 510, all received in evidence without objection, document the evidence and information law enforcement had developed concerning the charges in Stapley I. This information was known to the MCAO before Supervisor Stapley was indicted. These documents establish that each charge in the Stapley I indictment was supported by probable cause.
- 57. The indictment contains 118 counts. The number of counts was not the result of improper motive. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 137-138; Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 69-70.
- 58. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden Supervisor Stapley when his office pursued Stapley I. Tr. 10/27/11, pp. 16-17.
- 59. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden Supervisor Stapley when his office pursued Stapley I.

60. Before the indictment was announced and served on Supervisor Stapley, Respondent Thomas had a discussion with Mr. MacDonnell about pursuing the Stapley I criminal case. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 39-40; Tr. 10/27/11, pp. 18-19.

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- 61. Mr. MacDonnell discouraged Respondent Thomas from moving forward, but Mr. MacDonnell's reasons were all political, rather than a concern about the merits. Id.
- 62. Before securing Supervisor Stapley's indictment in Stapley I, Respondent Aubuchon had not in fact discussed with any Civil Division deputy the substance of any legal advice that may have been given to Supervisor Stapley about his disclosure form. Exhibit 248A, pp. 6-7.
- 63. The Bar has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Supervisor Stapley in fact harbored a reasonable belief that he was personally an MCAO client.
- 64. After the Stapley I indictment was served on Supervisor Stapley, his lawyers, among other things, sought to disqualify the MCAO on the basis of an alleged conflict. Mr. Stapley's lawyers argued that the MCAO could not prosecute Mr. Stapley because, they argued, Mr. Stapley personally was an MCAO client. Exhibit 107.
- 65. Following receipt of the motion, Respondent Thomas received assurances from three different sources (Mr. MacDonnell, Barnett Lotstein and Peter Jarvis) that he did not have a conflict. Tr. 10/24/11, pp. 40, 57-59; tr. 10/26/11, pp. 37-38; tr. 10/27/11, pp. 16-17.
 - 66. Despite believing that his office did not have a conflict

prosecuting Supervisor Stapley, Respondent Thomas asked the Yavapai County Attorney, Sheila Polk, to take the case. Tr. 10/27/11, p.33.

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- 67. Sheila Polk enlisted the help of Mel Bowers, a former Navajo County Attorney. Tr. 10/18/11, p. 196.
- 68. Both Ms. Polk and Mr. Bowers concluded that there had been "clear cut violations of the law." Tr. 10/19/11, p. 68.
- 69. Obtaining the single disclosure form in 2007 did not cause law enforcement to know or even to have reason to know that Supervisor Stapley had committed financial disclosure violations as to any of his other financial disclosure forms. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 37-38; tr. 10/24/11, pp. 40, 57-59; tr. 10/27/11, p. 16.
- 70. Law enforcement did not know nor have reason to know that Supervisor Stapley had committed financial disclosure violations as to any of his financial disclosure forms until 2008.
- 71. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that law enforcement knew or had reason to know that Supervisor Stapley had committed financial disclosure violations as to any of his financial disclosure forms any time before 2008.
- 72. Respondent Thomas did not know that any statute of limitation on any potential charge against Supervisor Stapley had run before the indictment was returned. As County Attorney, Respondent Thomas did not involve himself in the evaluation of statute of limitations issues as to any criminal cases in his office. Tr. 10/26/11, p. 238.
- 73. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged

in counts 4, 5 and 9.

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74. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 4, 5 and 9.

Chinese Wall representation (count 6)

75. In a motion filed during the Stapley I prosecution, Respondent Aubuchon made the following statement:

The State is not intending to use any communications between any attorney in the Maricopa County Attorneys' Office and the defendant, nor is there any information to believe that any statements relating to this case were ever made or advice ever given. The civil division has informed the County Attorney that during the last four years, no deputy county attorney has been asked by any Supervisor, including the defendant, to assist or advise that Supervisor in the preparation of their individual financial disclosure forms. Regardless, the prosecution is not seeking to use any such confidences in this case. There has been and is a "Chinese wall" between the criminal and civil division of the County Attorney's office in the prosecution of this case.

Exhibit 248A, pp. 6-7 (Bates 7950-1).

- 76. During Respondent Aubuchon's employment at the MCAO, the Civil Division attorneys were prohibited from disclosing the substance of civil advice given to County officials. Id; tr. 10/26/11, pp. 86-87.
- 77. The criminal and civil divisions of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office were physically located in different buildings. Tr. 9/13/11, p. 206. Respondent Aubuchon had no regular communications, job related or otherwise, with employees in the civil division. Respondent Aubuchon had no communication with any

employee in the civil division concerning the criminal prosecution of Mr. Stapley. Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 27-28.

- 78. It was not a misrepresentation to refer to the separation between the civil and criminal divisions in the MCAO as a "Chinese wall."
- 79. Respondent Thomas did not write the filing, approve it before it was filed, or "adopt" it in any way. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 84-85.
- 80. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to the "Chinese wall" reference made in the filing prepared by Respondent Aubuchon.
- 81. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to the "Chinese wall" reference made in the filing prepared by Respondent Aubuchon.

Judge Fields Bar charge (count 7)

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- 82. At the time of the Stapley I indictment, Judge Barbara Mundell was the Presiding Judge of Maricopa County. Tr. 10/3/11, pp. 91, 101-102.
- 83. Judge Mundell decided that she could not let one of the regular line judges preside over Stapley I for fear it might create problems during budget negotiations with the County. Id.
- 84. Judge Mundell left voice messages to more than one retired judge to call her. Id., p. 103.
- 85. Retired Judge Kenneth Fields was the first to respond to and he volunteered his services. Id.; tr.9/13/11, p.9.

86. Judge Baca, the Presiding Criminal Judge, appointed Judge Fields to preside over the case by minute entry dated December 4, 2008. Exhibit 39.

- 87. Upon receiving Judge Baca's minute entry, Respondent Aubuchon developed questions about Judge Fields's appointment. Respondent Aubuchon could not tell from the minute entry the reasons behind appointing Judge Fields. The manner of his appointment was contrary to Respondent Aubuchon's experience of random assignment of judges. Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 73-74.
- 88. At the time Judge Fields was appointed, Ms. Aubuchon had reason to believe that Judge Fields was prejudiced against Respondent Thomas and the MCAO. Exhibit 27.
- 89. In a different filing in the Stapley I prosecution, challenging Judge Fields's assignment, Respondent Aubuchon stated the following in an argument heading: "Judge Fields is the complainant in an open and pending State Bar matter that he initiated against County Attorney Thomas." Id., p. 6 (Bates 598).
- 90. Judge Fields had filed a Bar charge against attorney Dennis Wilenchik. The charge itself does not refer to Respondent Thomas, but the Bar sent it to Respondent Thomas, and directed him to respond. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 60-61.
- 91. Respondent Aubuchon attached a copy of the Fields Bar charge as an exhibit to the motion in which the argument heading quoted in $\P 89$ appears. Exhibit 27 (Bates 645).
- 92. Respondent Thomas did not write the filing, approve it before it was filed, know about it or "adopt" it in any way.

94. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to the bar charge reference made in the filing prepared by Respondent Aubuchon.

August 2009 news release (count 11)

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- 95. By minute entry dated August 24, 2009, Judge Fields dismissed multiple counts against Supervisor Stapley, finding that the BOS had failed to properly adopt the financial disclosure requirements Supervisor Stapley was charged with violating. Exhibit 110.
- 96. Following Judge Fields's ruling, Respondent Thomas issued something styled "Statement of Maricopa County Attorney's Office regarding ruling today in Stapley criminal case." Exhibit 243.
- 97. Mr. Thomas did not know or reasonably should have known that the statements contained in the August 2009 news release would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the Stapley I criminal case.
- 98. IBC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Thomas knew or reasonably should have known that the statements contained in the August 2009 news release would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the Stapley I criminal case.
- 99. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards when issuing the

August 2009 news release.

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100. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards when issuing the August 2009 news release.

December 2009 letters re hiring and paying Shughart Thomson (count 12)

101. Respondent Thomas sent a letter dated December 5, 2008, to then-Chairman Andrew Kunasek. Exhibit 40. The letter states in part:

Executive Session this cancel you to accompanying Open Meeting item, and to consult with the Civil Division of the County Attorney for legal advice unless and until a conflict on a particular item is declared by the County Attorney. If you proceed with this action item to appoint outside counsel to perform a duty that the Constitution of Arizona entrusts to the County Attorney, you will be putting the Board in a very performing illeqal position of an precarious Likewise, doing so may subject the Board to actions under §11-642 for recovery of §11-641 orillegally paid. Bates 1160 (emphasis added).

102. Later, after the Board had, in Respondent Thomas's view, unlawfully engaged the Shughart Thomson law firm, Respondent Thomas sent identical letters to the acting County Manager, the County Treasurer and the County Chief Financial Officer. Exhibit 66. The letters demand that warrants (a form of payment used by the County) not be issued to the outside law firm that the Board had (in Respondent Thomas's view) unlawfully hired. The letters go on to state:

1 2 Should any such warrants issue, their issuance may give rise to actions under A.R.S. §§11-641 or 11-642 for recovery of monies illegally paid. In that event, you would not be entitled to the immunity provisions of A.R.S. §38-446.

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Id. at Bates 1309 (emphasis supplied.)

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103. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to embarrass, burden or delay Chairman Kunasek, the three County officials who received exhibit 66, or the Shughart Thomson law firm when sending exhibits 40 and 66.

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104. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass, burden or delay Chairman Kunasek, the three County officials who received exhibit 66 or the Shughart Thomson law firm when sending exhibits 40 and 66.

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105. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards when sending exhibits

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106. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards when sending exhibits 40 and 66.

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Court Tower investigation (counts 13 and 14)

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In late 2008, a grand jury subpoena was Maricopa County Administration relating to the construction of the

issued to

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The subpoena was sought by Respondent Aubuchon, the Court Tower.

deputy MCA assigned to conduct the grand jury investigation.

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Exhibit 44.

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108. Although MCAO civil deputies had given legal advice to

various County personnel regarding the Tower, IBC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any advice was given about the subject of the investigation, which was whether there had been some kind of criminal quid pro quo in the hiring of Phoenix attorney Tom Irvine as a "space planner." Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 208-209.

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- 109. Respondent Aubuchon had attended Court Tower meetings, but not in the role of legal advisor. She provided no legal advice to any County official concerning any civil matter related to the Court Tower Project. Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 81-83.
- 110. Neither the Board of Supervisors nor the County itself was the objects of the investigation. As a nonjural entity, the MCBOS could not be charged with a crime. Tr. 9/14/11, p. 187; tr. 10/25/11, p. 85.
- 111. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office issued a grand jury subpoena to Maricopa County administration.
- 112. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office issued a grand jury subpoena to Maricopa County administration.
- 113. Respondent Thomas did not have any personal interest, as that expression in used in ER 1.7(a)(2), in the so-called Court Tower investigation.
- 114. IBC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas had any personal interest, as that expression is

used in ER 1.7(a)(2), in the so-called Court Tower investigation.

115. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 13 and 14.

116. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 13 and 14.

RICO (counts 15-20)

117. On approximately November 1, 2009, Respondent Thomas tasked Respondent Aubuchon with the responsibility to draft and file a RICO complaint against the BOS, its members, two Maricopa County administrators, four judges, and three attorneys. Tr. 10/25/11, p. 93; Tr. 10/2/11, p. 147.

118. Before filing the complaint, Respondent Aubuchon researched the factual allegations and RICO legal issues, and edited drafts of the complaint after receiving input from others in the MCAO. Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 93-94.

119. The RICO complaint was filed on December 1, 2009. Exhibit 145.

120. Respondent Thomas's name appeared in the caption of the RICO suit. He was a party to the action in his official capacity, not one of the lawyers prosecuting the case. Tr. 10/26/11, pp. 54-55.

121. Respondent Thomas incorporates by reference Respondent Aubuchon's proposed finding of fact number 9, on page 89 of her

Final Argument memorandum.

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- 122. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office pursued the RICO lawsuit on his behalf.
- 123. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office pursued the RICO lawsuit on his behalf.
- 124. There was a good faith basis in law and fact that was not frivolous for bringing the RICO lawsuit. Tr. 10/27/11, pp. 111-112.
- 125. With the exception of the Board of Supervisors, none of the defendants listed in the RICO caption was personally an MCAO clients. Tr. 9/14/11, p. 187.
- 126. Although the MCAO does represent the BOS, because it is not a jural entity the BOS was never a proper party defendant, and would have been dismissed.
- 127. Respondent Thomas did not have a personal interest that created a substantial risk of materially limiting the representation of Sheriff Arpaio in the RICO action.
- 128. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas had a personal interest that created a substantial risk of materially limiting the representation of Sheriff Arpaio in the RICO action.
- 129. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

130. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

Stapley II/Wilcox (counts 21-23)

131. The MCSO began an investigation of Supervisor Wilcox on May 12, 2009, because of a Phoenix Magazine article entitled "A Rose By Any Other Name." Tr. 10/13/11, pp. 205-207.

132. The article alleged that Ms. Wilcox had failed to publicly disclose loans her business had received (and which she and her husband had personally guaranteed) from a subsidiary of Chicanos Por La Causa, a county contractor who had also recently received government funds, distributed by Maricopa County. Supervisor Wilcox voted to approve the disbursement of those funds without disclosing the obvious conflict. Ex. 284.

133. An investigation by the MCSO ensued. Tr. 10/13/11, pp. 205-207.

134. Following the indictment in Stapley I, MCSO investigators continued to look into Supervisor Stapley's business dealings. Additional evidence was gathered about loans, campaign accounts and Mr. Stapley's dealings with the Arizona Real Estate Department. Among other things, a 1031 real property exchange-transaction was found; as a consequence of that swap, Mr. Stapley received approximately \$15,900 per month from August 2004 to July 2007 under an option. The option payments increased to approximately \$25,900 per month beginning August of 2007, and continued until July 2008.

Exhibit 18 (Bates 113-342); Exhibit 30; Exhibit 96; Exhibit 304; Exhibit 305.

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135. On May 19, 2009, Sheriff's investigators began a detailed investigation into Mr. Stapley's affiliation with NaCO, the National Association of Counties, a non-governmental association. Investigators learned that Mr. Stapley had actively solicited funds from private donors under the premise of running for the position of NaCO's Second Vice-President. Mr. Stapley received donations totaling almost \$140,000, even though, it turns out, he ran unopposed for the position. Investigators determined that Mr. Stapley used a significant portion of the funds for personal expenses. At least \$10,000 was received after he was elected. Exhibit 306.

136. Supervisor Wilcox was indicted, initially, on December 7, 2009, and then indicted a second time on January 25, 2010. Exhibits 160-161, 174 and 193.

137. Mr. Stapley was indicted the second time, in December 2009, on the strength of MCSO's investigation (Stapley II). Exhibit 306.

138. Before the Stapley II and Wilcox indictments were handed down, the MCAO had sought the BOS's approval to hire special prosecutors to handle the matters. Exhibit 131.

139. The BOS refused to approve the appointment, citing questionable grounds for its refusal. Tr. 10/126/11, pp. 143-144, 191-192.

140. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to

embarrass or burden when the MCAO obtained the indictments in Stapley II and Wilcox.

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- 141. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when the MCAO obtained the indictments in Stapley II and Wilcox.
- 142. Respondent Thomas was not simultaneously prosecuting Supervisors Stapley and Wilcox at the same time he was suing them as a party.
- 143. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to the prosecution of Stapley II and Wilcox.
- 144. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to the prosecution of Stapley II and Wilcox.

Donahoe criminal prosecution (counts 24-30)

- 145. Before criminal charges were filed against Judge Gary Donahoe on December 9, 2009, all of the following facts and circumstances existed:
- a. A motion to quash a grand jury subpoena, issued to secure records to investigate criminal charges concerning the so-called Court Tower, a County facility financed with hundreds of millions of dollars of public monies, built especially for the use of the Superior Court, was filed (Exhibit 56);
 - b. Although the criminal investigation concerned

allegations of criminal patronage involving Supervisor Stapley (whose criminal case had led Presiding Judge Barbara Mundell, the judge who appointed Judge Donahoe to his position as Presiding Criminal Judge, to appoint someone other than a sitting Maricopa County Superior Judge to preside over the Stapley criminal case), Judge Donahoe refused to recuse himself from consideration of the motion to quash, a refusal that to a reasonable lawyer appeared to be a violation of the Canon of Judicial Ethics (Exhibit 85);

- c. At the same time, Judge Donahoe disqualified the MCAO from pursuing the grand jury investigation despite lacking a legally sufficient basis to disqualify the MCAO (Id);
- d. At the same time, Judge Donahoe refused to disqualify the law firm representing the BOS in the matter despite the fact one of the firm's principals was the subject of the investigation, a fact Judge Donahoe knew (Id);
- e. Shortly thereafter, Judge Donahoe assigned to himself the lower court appeal in LC2009-000701 DT, an appeal from a lower court decision denying a motion to controvert a search executed on the business premises of entities owned or controlled by Conley Wolfswinkel, someone with whom Supervisor Stapley (himself the subject of ongoing criminal investigations for which the subpoena was issued) did business (Exhibit 523, at Bates 010011);
- f. The manner in which Judge Donahoe assigned the case to himself was not only contrary to established court policy (tr. 10/3/11, pp. 125-127), but also was done in such a way as to

suggest he deliberately sought out a case that would otherwise never have been assigned to him;

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- g. Judge Donahoe overturned the lower court in a ruling that appears not only to be wrong, but also to have failed to adhere to the statutorily-established standards of review applicable to such lower court appeals (Exhibit 523 at Bates 01001-5);
- Upon receiving an unnumbered court filing styled h. and Deputy "Notice Motion re: Unauthorized Special Attorneys," a motion that appeared to be yet another effort by the BOS to prevent criminal investigations into their activities, and a pointing that the motion response from the MCAO out procedurally irregular and that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it, Judge Donahoe nonetheless set a December 9, 2009, hearing on the motion (Exhibit 137; Exhibit 141; Exhibit 144);
- i. Judge Donahoe later refused to vacate the hearing despite the fact his office received a motion to disqualify him filed under Rule 10.1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Rule that requires the judge that is the subject of the motion to stay all proceedings until after the motion is ruled upon (Tr. 10/25/11, pp. 183-184).
- 146. There was probable cause to bring criminal charges against Judge Donahoe on December 9, 2009.
- 147. The criminal charges against Judge Donahoe were filed on the morning of December 9, 2009. The charges were filed at that time because the prosecutors and Sheriff believed that Judge

Donahoe's conduct constituted ongoing criminal conduct. Respondent Thomas separately wanted the charges filed before a press conference he had scheduled the morning of December 9. Respondent Thomas was also concerned that if charges were filed after the December 9 hearing, they would be falsely labeled retaliatory. The charges were not filed at that time, or ever, to force Judge Donahoe to vacate the December 9 hearing. Tr. 10/25/11, p. 187; Tr. 10/26/11, p. 186-187.

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- 148. Respondent Thomas did not know the charges filed on December 9, 2009, against Judge Donahoe lacked probable cause.
- 149. IBC has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas knew the charges filed on December 9, 2009, against Judge Donahoe lacked probable cause.
- 150. Respondent Thomas had a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office caused a direct criminal complaint to be filed against Judge Donahoe on December 9.
- 151. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas lacked a substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden when his office caused a direct criminal complaint to be filed against Judge Donahoe on December 9.
- 152. Respondent Thomas did not know the charges against Judge Donahoe were false.
- 153. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas knew the charges against Judge Donahoe were false.
 - 154. Before the direct complaint was filed, Det. Almanza and

Sgt. Luth had a meeting in Respondent Aubuchon's office during which she went through the documents establishing Judge Donahoe's guilt. Tr. 10/11/11, pp. 127-8, 147, 185; tr. 10/14/11, pp. 175-6; Tr. 10/25/11, p. 196.

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155. Respondent Aubuchon assured Sgt. Luth in response to his question that she thought the charges against Judge Donahoe were valid. Id.

156. If the direct complaint is signed by an officer, the officer attests that the contents are based merely "on information and belief." Tr. 10/25/11, p. 190; Exhibit 163 (Bates 1906).

157. The law enforcement officer who signed the direct complaint, Det. Almanza, denied believing that what he signed was false. He was told by his superior, Sgt. Luth, that he (Almanza) could "answer that question [whether the complaint is true and correct to the best of his knowledge] truthfully and say yes." Tr. 10/11/11, pp. 133-34. Tr. 10/14/11, pp. 119-120.

158. Both Det. Almanza and Respondent Aubuchon testified that Ms. Aubuchon had no idea that Det. Almanza would be the person signing the complaint. Tr. 10/11/11, p. 136, 174-5; tr. 10/25/11, p. 199.

159. Respondent Thomas did not know or believe that whichever law enforcement officer signed the direct complaint would be committing perjury.

160. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas knew or believed that whichever law enforcement officer signed the direct complaint would be committing

perjury.

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- 161. Respondent Thomas did not know Det. Almanza would be the person signing the Donahoe criminal complaint. Tr. 10/25/11, p. 198.
- 162. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas knew Det. Almanza would be the person signing the Donahoe criminal complaint.
- 163. Respondent Thomas did not conspire with anyone to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate Judge Donahoe from the exercise of his constitutional rights.
- 164. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas conspired with anyone to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate Judge Donahoe from the exercise of his constitutional rights.
- 165. Respondent Thomas did not decide to go forward with criminal charges against Judge Donahoe on December 9 to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate Judge Donahoe from the exercise of his constitutional rights.
- 166. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas decided to go forward with criminal charges against Judge Donahoe on December 9 to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate Judge Donahoe from the exercise of his constitutional rights.
- 167. Respondent Thomas did not himself represent the State in the criminal case against Judge Donahoe.
 - 168. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable

mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

169. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in counts 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

Bug Sweep (count 31)

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- 170. Respondent Aubuchon, not Respondent Thomas, represented the State during the grand jury proceedings relating to investigations of Judge Donahoe, Thomas Irvine, Andrew Kunasek, David Smith and Sandi Wilson. Exhibit 185.
- 171. None of the persons being investigated by the grand jury was an MCAO client.
- 172. Respondent Thomas did not have any personal interest that created a substantial risk that the representation of the State by Respondent Aubuchon was materially limited.
- 173. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas had any personal interest that created a substantial risk that the representation of the State by Respondent Aubuchon was materially limited.
- 174. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in count 31.
- 175. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in count 31.

Failure to cooperate (count 33)

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- 176. The filing of exhibits 221 through 238 during the course of IBC's screening investigation did not constitute a refusal to cooperate with officials and staff of the State Bar.
- 177. The filing of exhibits 221 through 238 during the course of IBC's screening investigation did not constitute a failure to furnish information to officials and staff of the State Bar.
- 178. Respondent Thomas did not possess any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in count 33.
- 179. IBC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Thomas possessed any of the culpable mental states set forth in the ABA Standards as to conduct alleged in count 33.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. Respondent did not violate ER 1.7(a)(1) by sending exhibits 6 through 10 to the MCBOS in 2006.
- 2. Respondent did not violate ER 1.6 when he disclosed in the 2006 news release (exhibit 13) that he had previously advised the Board about the dispute over hiring counsel because the disclosure was authorized by ER 1.13.
- 3. Respondent did not violate ER 3.6 when he issued the 2006 news release.
- 4. A County Attorney does not represent personally the constituents of any County department or the BOS merely by virtue of the County Attorney's role as legal advisor to the BOS.
 - 5. Supervisor Stapley was not personally an MCAO client.

6. Respondent did not violate ER 1.7(a)(1) by virtue of the MCAO's prosecution of Supervisor Stapley in Stapley I.

- 7. A prosecutor who pursues a criminal case supported by probable cause has a substantial purpose for purposes of ER 4.4(a).
- 8. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) by authorizing MCAO's prosecution of Supervisor Stapley in Stapley I.
- 9. The statute of limitations on the misdemeanors counts against Supervisor Stapley did not begin to run in 2007, but rather began to run in 2008.
- 10. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 8.4(d) by charging Supervisor Stapley as to the 44 misdemeanor charges in Stapley I.
- 11. Because the MCBOS failed to properly adopt financial disclosure requirements for the Board, there was no failure-to-disclose crime committed in the single financial disclosure form obtained by Mr. Goldman in 2007. Because there was as a matter of law no crime, no statute of limitations could begin to run in 2007. Respondent Thomas therefore did not as a matter of law violate 8.4(d).
- 12. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 3.6(a) by issuing the August 2009 public statement about Judge Field's dismissal of multiple counts in Stapley I
- 13. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) by sending exhibits 40 and 66.
- 14. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) by authorizing grand jury subpoenas and public records requests issued to the County for production of records relating to Court Tower.

15. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(1) by authorizing grand jury subpoenas and public records requests issued to the County for production of records relating to Court Tower.

- 16. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(s) by authorizing grand jury subpoenas and public records requests issued to the County for production of records relating to Court Tower.
- 17. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) by bringing the RICO suit.
- 18. Respondent Thomas did not violate any of the ERs alleged in Counts 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 or 20.
- 19. The RICO defendants were not immune from potential federal RICO liability by virtue of Supreme Court Rule 48(1).
- 20. The judge defendants in the RICO case did not enjoy judicial immunity from federal RICO liability.
- 21. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) in either the prosecution of Stapley II or the prosecution of Supervisor Wilcox.
- 22. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(1) in the prosecution of Supervisor Wilcox.
- 23. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(2) in the prosecution of Supervisor Wilcox.
- 24. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(2) in the prosecution of Supervisor Stapley in Stapley II.
- 25. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 3.8(a) by authorizing criminal charges against Judge Donahoe he knew to be unsupported by probable cause.
 - 26. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 4.4(a) by

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authorizing criminal charges against Judge Donahoe.

- 27. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 8.4(c) by authorizing criminal charges against Judge Donahoe.
- 28. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 8.4(b) by authorizing criminal charges against Judge Donahoe.
- 29. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(2) by authorizing criminal charges against Judge Donahoe.
- 30. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(1) in connection with the so-called Bug sweep grand jury investigation.
- 31. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(2) in connection with the so-called Bug sweep grand jury investigation.
- 32. Respondent Thomas did not violate ER 1.7(a)(2) in connection with the presentation by Respondent Aubuchon of the criminal charges against Judge Donahoe to a grand jury.
- 33. Respondent Thomas did not violate former Supreme Court Rule 53(d) during the screening investigation.
- 34. Respondent Thomas did not violate former Supreme Court Rule 53(f) during the screening investigation.

DATED this 19th day of January, 2012.

BROENING, OBERG, WOODS & WILSON, P.C.

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